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Crimes of moral turpitude, until 1980, were sufficient grounds

for forfeiture of public employee pension rights. In Masse v. Board of
Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System,' the appellate division distinguished these crimes in terms of relation to public employment and resultant incarceration. 2 Holding that a crime of moral turpitude unrelated to public employment is insufficient cause for
revocation,' the court redefined "honorable service,"' and reduced
the discretionary component inherent in pension hearings.
Mr. Masse began service with the Borough of Highlands in
1947.6 As Assistant Superintendent of the Water and Sewer Department, he became eligible for early retirement pension benefits by

175 N.J. Super. 325, 418 A.2d 1282 (App. Div.) certif. granted, No. 17698 (Nov. 10,
1980).
2

Prior to Masse, it was generally held that pensions were revocable "'where the criminal

conduct touche[d] the administration of the public employee's office or position, or where the
conduct involve[d] moral turpitude." Makwinski v. State, 76 N.J. 87, 90, 385 A.2d 1227, 1229
(1978). See note 48 infra.
175 N.J. Super. at 330-31, 418 A.2d at 1284-85. Moral turpitude
has been defined as an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." Black's
Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) ....
But the attempt to apply these definitions to
specific criminal acts . . . has demonstrated only the elasticity of the phrase and its
necessarily adaptive character, reflective at all times of the common moral sense
prevailing throughout the community.
State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Weiner, 68 N.J. Super. 468, 483-84, 172 A.2d 661, 669
(App. Div. 1961). For a further discussion of moral turpitude, and related cases, see id. at
483-85, 172 A.2d at 669-70. See also Brun v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 191 A. 240 (1937).
' 175 N.J. Super. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1286. In Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113
N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct. 1934), affd, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (E & A 1935), the
court described honorable service as "that [behavior] characterized by or in accordance with
principles of honor. One so serving is scrupulously upright, and shows a fine regard for obligations as to conduct." Id. at 233, 173 A. at 924.
' 175 N.J. Super. at 328, 418 A.2d at 1283. "The factual finding of dishonorable service for
an award of public employee retirement benefits is vested in the Board of Trustees." Brief for
Respondent at 12, Masse v. Board of Trustees, Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 175 N.J.
Super. 325, 418 A.2d 1282 (App. Div.), certif. granted, No. 17698 (Nov. 10, 1980).
175 N.J. Super. at 327, 418 A.2d at 1283.
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1973.' In March of 1976, Mr. Masse's previously uneventful service
was interrupted by an indictment for various morals charges under
New Jersey Statutes Annotated §§ 2A: 96-3 & -4.8 He was convicted
on two counts of debauching the morals of a minor, 9 fined, designated
for psychiatric counseling, and given concurrent suspended
sentences. "'
Prior to his conviction, Mr. Masse had been temporarily removed from employment, yet, within three weeks of his suspension
he was reinstated to his former position." Despite this reinstatement, the Board of Trustees (Board) unconditionally declared his
thirty years of service "dishonorable," and annulled all pension credits thereby acquired. 1 2 The Board decided that Mr. Masse's past
pension contributions would be refunded to him, and a new period of
"honorable service""' would commence. Mr. Masse appealed the final
ruling of the Board of Trustees, 4 and on August 4, 1980, '5 his pension
rights were restored by the appellate division.16
7 Id. at 332, 418 A.2d at 1285. Mr. Masse had fulfilled the minimum requirement of 25
years of service as designated in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-41(b) (West 1962), which entitled
him to receive at that point an annuity and a graduated pension. 175 N.J. Super. at 332, 418
A.2d at 1285.
Victor Masse enrolled in the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) on January 1,
1955, and was granted an additional six and one-half years of veteran service credit. Petition for
Certification at 3, Masse v. Board of Trustees, Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 175 N.J.
Super. 325, 418 A.2d 1282 (App. Div.), certif. granted, No. 17698 (Nov. 10, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Petition for Certification]. See also Watt v. Mayor of Franklin, 21 N.J. 274, 280, 121
A.2d 499, 502 (1956).
' 175 N.J. Super. at 327, 418 A.2d at 1283.
' Id.Both counts arose under a statute providing that: "'[anyperson who forces or induces
any child under the age of 16 years to do or to submit to any act which tends to debauch the
child or impair its morals, is guilty of a misdemeanor." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:96-3 (West 1969).
"0175 N.J. Super. at 327, 418 A.2d at 1283. The actual sentence handed down by Judge
Shebell read,
[H]e ishereby sentenced to: the New Jersey State Prison for a term of not less than
one year and not more than three years on each of counts seven and nine to run
concurrently. Sentence suspended and the defendant placed on probation for a
period of two years . . . fine[d] . . . $1,000.00 . . . . [and Masse] must have
psychiatric care.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at Appendix 8 (Judgment of Conviction), Masse v. Board of Trustees, Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 175 N.J. Super. 325, 418 A.2d 1282 (App. Div.), certif.
granted, No. 17698 (Nov. 10, 1980).
" 175 N.J. Super. at 331, 418 A.2d at 1285. Mr. Masse was originally appointed Assistant
Superintendent of the Water and Sewer Department in 1965. He still occupies the same position, although its title has been changed to Foreman. Petition for Certification, supra note 7, at
3.
12 175 N.J. Super. at 327, 418 A.2d at 1283.
"3Id. See also Connelly v. Municipal Employees' Pension Comm'n, 130 N.J.L. 101, 31 A.2d

488 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
175 N.J. Super. at 326, 418 A.2d at 1282.
's
'8

Id. at 325, 418 A.2d at 1282.
Id. at 334, 418 A.2d at 1287.
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Stating that it was not bound by any prior supreme court decisions on this issue, 1 the Masse court delivered an opinion which contravened almost 50 years of established case law. 8 The court
reasoned that the factual circumstances of this case, specifically, that
Masse's conviction was unrelated to his employment, 9 mandated a
discerning overview of similar issue-related decisions.
The revocation of pension rights issue had been previously considered at the appellate level in Plunkett v. Board of Pension
Commissioners.2" In Plunkett, a fireman convicted of various charges
of misconduct, including the embezzlement of monies from the
Hoboken Fireman's Relief Association,"' was dismissed from the fire
department without pension. 2 Although Plunkett met the minimum
age and length of service requirements,2 the court upheld denial of
his pension on the grounds that his crime of moral turpitude ren24
dered all past employment dishonorable.
Honorable service as "an essential prerequisite" ' was justified
on several grounds. According to the Plunkett court, "honorable service" acted as an inducement for virtuous and efficient employment,
particularly after minimum pension standards had been attained.2"
The court went on to state that, "[i]t [was] not incumbent upon a
17 Id.

at 326, 418 A.2d at 1282.

18The court reaffirmed the principle of requiring honorable service for pension eligibility
established in Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113 N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct.
1934), aff'd, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (E. & A. 1935), but overruled the contention that
crimes of moral turpitude, per se, render such service dishonorable. See, e.g., Makwinski v.
State, 76 N.J. 87, 385 A.2d 1227 (1978); Mount v. Trustees, Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.,
133 N.J. Super. 72, 335 A.2d 559 (App. Div. 1975); Hozer v. State, 95 N.J. Super, 196, 230
A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967); Pfitzinger v. Board of Trustees, 62 N.J. Super. 589, 163 A.2d 388
(App. Div. 1960).
" 175 N.J. Super. at 330-32, 418 A.2d at 1285.
- 113 N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (E. & A.
1935).
21 Id. at 231, 173 A. at 923. Some controversy exists as to whether Plunkett's crimes were
employment-related. The Attorney General's office in supporting the Board's position in Masse
appeared to be of the opinion that they were not. Petition for Certification, supra note 8, at 7.
The Plunkett court, however, indicated otherwise, stating that Plunkett was convicted of
offenses "in violation of departmental rules and regulations." 113 N.J.L. at 231, 173 A. at 923.
22 113 N.J.L. at 231, 173 A. at 923.
1 Id. at 31-32, 173 A. at 923. The court stated that Plunkett would have been eligible for
his pension benefits "having attained the age of 50 years and having honorably served for a
period of twenty years in the said Hoboken fire department." 113 N.J.L. at 232, 173 A. at 923.
Similarly, Masse, prior to his conviction, had acquired eligibility for early retirement benefits under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-41(b) (West 1962). See note 7 supra.
113 N.J.L. at 233, 173 A. at 924.
Id. at 234, 173 A. at 924.
26 Id. at 232, 173 A. at 924. See Makwinski v. State, 76 N.J. 87, 385 A.2d 1227 (1978);
Connelly v. Municipal Employees' Pension Comm'n, 130 N.J.L. 101, 31 A.2d 488 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
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municipality, or other division of government, to establish a system of
pensions. It [was] rather a question of public policy." 2 7 Therefore, a
crime of moral turpitude, with its inference of dishonor, formed an
adequate basis for revoking pension benefits.2s The court concluded
by asserting that no vested right to a pension accrued merely by the
fulfillment of minimum retirement criteria. 2 This marked the beginning of judicial adherence to the policy that "honorable service is a
sine qua non" for obtaining pension benefits. 3°
Similarly, in Ballurio v. Castellini,3' the appellate division upheld
the Plunkett standards 32 when faced with the question of whether a
public employee, discharged for moral turpitude, was entitled to a
pension applied for prior to conviction and dismissal. 3 The court
held that the granting of a pension was justifiably delayed pending
conviction or acquittal - on illegal abortion charges,3 5 but that "conviction would require denial thereof. ''
The Ballurio court reiterated the Plunkett exemplar, holding that
37
'honorable' service is implicit in every [pension] enactment,
"

113 N.J.L. at 232, 173 A. at 924.
' Id. at 233, 173 A. at 924.
Id. The Plunkett court expressly stated that:
[t]he rule is that compulsory deductions from the salaries of governmental employes, by the authority of the government, for the support of a pension fund,
create no contractual or vested right between such employees and the government,
and neither the employes, nor those claiming under them, have any rights except
such as are conferred by the statutes creating and governing the fund. . . The
requirement of honorable service is not qualified by the provision of twenty years'
minimum service as a prerequisite to retirement on pension.
Id. at 233-34, 173 A. at 924. See, e.g., Mount v, Trustees, Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.,
133 N.J. Super. 72, 335 A.2d 559 (App. Div. 1975); Hozer v. State, 95 N.J. Super. 196, 230
A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967); Pfitzinger v. Board of Trustees, 62 N.J. Super. 589, 163 A.2d 388
(App. Div. 1960); Salley v. Firemen's & Policemen's Fund Comm'n, 124 N.J.L. 79, 11 A.2d
244 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Walter v. Police & Fire Pension Comm'n, 120 N.J.L. 39, 198 A. 383 (Sup.
Ct. 1938).
Id. at 232, 173 A. at 924. For additional cases following this policy, see note 18 supra.
3' 29 N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1954).
32 Id. at 389-90, 102 A.2d at 666.
3 Id. at 386, 102 A.2d at 664.
Id. at 387, 102 A.2d at 664. In refusing to process Ballurio's pension application, the court
followed the policy iterated in McFeely v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 1 N.J. 212, 62 A.2d 686
(1948), that pension boards "may, and in most cases should, certainly so where the offense
charged involves moral turpitude, stay action upon the pension claim awaiting the trial or other
disposition of a pending indictment against the claimant." Id. at 217, 62 A.2d at 689.
' 29 N.J. Super. at 386, 102 A.2d at 664.
- Id. at 387, 102 A.2d at 665. This statement was originally derived from the opinion of the
trial court, Ballurio v. Castellini, 27 N.J. Super. 113, 98 A.2d 902 (Law Div. 1953), but the
appellate division repeated and reaffirmed that "conviction must be deemed to wipe out the
temporarily inoperative privilege [of obtaining pension benefits] as of the date of suspension."
id. at 391, 102 A.2d at 666.
" 29 N.J. Super. at 389, 102 A.2d at 666.
21
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whether or not the words "served honorably" appeared in the Act. 31
Moral turpitude offenses were acknowledged as constituting ample
cause for denying pension privileges. 39 In final affirmation, the Ballurio court concluded that "[t]he fact that [defendant] had veteran
status, the age qualification, and the minimum service requirement,
d[id] not signify that he had a vested right to [a] pension." 40
Ballurio, although following Plunkett's standards for "honorable
service," 41 primarily decided the issue of the timing of pension
applications. 41 Inherent in this decision, however, was the consideration that Ballurio was discharged for a crime of moral turpitude, unrelated to his employment. 3 The cessation of employment was the
4
technicality which disqualified him from receiving pension benefits.1
Significantly, in Masse, the superior court was presented with an
analogous factual situation, 45 which additionally included the unusual
aspect of an employee not discharged for a crime of moral turpitude."6

I Id. See Mount v. Trustees, Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 81,
335 A.2d 559, 564 (App. Div. 1975); Fromm v. Board of Directors, 81 N.J. Super. 138, 142,
195 A.2d 32, 34 (App. Div. 1963).
29 N.J. Super. at 389, 102 A.2d at 666.
40 Id. at 390, 102 A.2d at 666. See also Pfitzinger v. Board of Trustees, 62 N.J. Super. 589,
163 A.2d 388 (1960).
"' See note 4 supra.
42 29 N.J. Super. at 386, 102 A.2d at 664.
[W]hen Ballurio was suspended, he was deprived of the privilege of obtaining a
pension until the criminal charge was disposed of. Acquittal would have restored
the claim, plus the right to back pay during the intervening period. But conviction
must be deemed to wipe out the temporarily inoperative privilege as of the date of
suspension.
Id. at 390-91, 102 A.2d at 666.
Id. Ballurio was employed as a foreman in the street department of the City of Vineland.
There is no question that his conviction for committing an illegal abortion was unrelated to his
employment. Id.
41 Id. at 394, 102 A.2d at 668. The appellate division also acknowledged that a crime of
moral turpitude, non-affliated with employment, may be cause for pension revocation, in Gauli
v. Board of Trustees, 143 N.J. Super. 480, 363 A.2d 911 (App. Div. 1976). Gauli was remanded, however, for determination of whether or not the crime committed (unlawful possession of a weapon), involved moral turpitude. 143 N.J. Super. at 483, 363 A.2d at 912-13.
' See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
' 175 N.J. Super. at 327, 418 A.2d at 1282. Unlike Masse, Ballurio was dismissed before his
pension was denied. 29 N.J. Super. at 388, 102 A.2d at 665.
An interesting situation, where an employee sustained a service-connected disability pending pension denial, was presented to the appellate division in Fromm v. Board of Directors, 81
N.J. Super. 138, 195 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1963). There, the court rejected plaintiff's application
for disability pension because he committed a crime of moral turpitude prior to his disablement.
Id. at 140-41, 195 A.2d at 33.
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The unsuitability of the prior case law 47 demanded that Masse be
decided on the basis of valid, independent reasoning. Of utmost importance to the court's decision was the absence of a statute expressly
calling for revocation of Masse's pension.4" The decision of the Board
of Trustees had been based upon its "administrative practice of long
standing."4' The Masse court, finding that this practice was not of
legislative origin, strictly limited its application to employmentrelated crime. 5 In so doing, the court did not dispute the contention
that honorable service is a valid prerequisite for pensioned
retirement., Accordingly, the court did not deny that dishonorable
service justifies pension denial. 2 Rather, the court held that Masse's
crime, by its remoteness from employment, did not render his service dishonorable."' Referring to the situational aspects of Masse's
case, the court ascetically asked, "should [an additional penalty] be
imposed for appellant's wrongdoing although the municipality has not

"

Prior case law, involving moral turpitude and denial of pension rights, was found to be
inapplicable to Masse's situation. In some instances, the plaintiff was no longer employed tinder
the pension system applied to. Ballurio v. Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d 662 (App.
Div. 1954); Walter v. Police & Fire Pension Comm'n, 120 N.J.L. 39, 198 A. 383 (Sup. Ct.
1938). In other situations, the plaintiff's crime of moral turpitude was employment-related.
Daigle v. McLaughlin, 193 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1961); Mount v. Trustees, Pub. Employees'
Retirement Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 335 A.2d 559 (App. Div. 1975); Hozer v. State, 95 N.J.
Super. 196, 230 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967); Fromm v. Board of Directors, 81 N.J. Super. 138,
195 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1963); Pfitzinger v. Board of Trustees, 62 N.J. Super. 589, 163 A.2d
388 (App. Div. 1960); Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113 N.J,L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup.
Ct. 1934), affd, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (E. & A. 1935).
1 175 N.J. Super. at 334, 418 A.2d at 1287. The court repeatedly stressed this point, finding that "[t]here [was] absolutely nothing in the PERS law that provided for the cancellation of
pension credits . . . in these circumstances," id. at 332, 418 A.2d at 1285, and therefore "an
employee should not be deprived of pension credits . . . in the absence of an express statutory
provision for such forfeiture." Id. at 334, 418 A.2d at 1287.
In addition, the court found N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (West 1962), dealing with "suspension of pension payments during . . . period[s] of incarceration for . . . crime[s] of moral turpitude," 175 N.J. Super. at 332, 418 A.2d at 1286, to be inapplicable because Masse was never
incarcerated for his crime. Id.
1 175 N.J. Super. at 327, 418 A.2d at 1283.
50 Id. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1286. Judge Botter stated that
a court-made rule calling for the forfeiture of pension rights in cases not specified
by the Legislature is suspect at the least. It should not go beyond the bounds of
In our view, criminal conduct unrelated to public service .... should
necessity ....
not be the basis for forfeiture of pension credits.
Id. at 332-33, 418 A.2d at 1286.
s' Id. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1286.
Ild.
53 Id. at 330-31, 418 A.2d at 1285. "[Tlhe offense was unrelated to public employment and,
in that sense, did not constitute dishonorable service and a betrayal of public trust." Id. But see
Makwinski v. State, 76 N.J. 87, 385 A.2d 1227 (1978) (offense related to public employment
held not to constitute dishonorable service).

1981]

NOTES

considered it so dishonorable or embarrassing as to require his
dismissal." m
A basic premise of the court's discourse was the recognition that
"pension credits represent[ed] to some extent deferred wages for serThus, the court dispensed with the outdated novices rendered."'
tion that "[a] pension [was] a bounty springing from the appreciation
and graciousness of the sovereign," and indicated its approval of the
judicial trend towards establishing pension rights.. 7 The court decided that these rights could not be dismissed solely on a finding of
had acquired sufficient pension rights
moral turpitude, 3 since Masse
59
offense.
his
to
to retire prior
Drawing its distinction in terms of employment-relation, the
court expressed the apprehension that a general standard of moral
Beturpitude would produce inequity in case-by-case application.'
cause of its fluctuating nature, moral turpitude, as an undefined punitive determinative, necessarily involved a considerable element of
administrative discretion." It was this element of discretion, coupled
with the realization that Masse had already been criminally
reprimanded,61 that led the court to renounce the Board's decision as
Advocating a policy of restraint,
a harsh and arbitrary punishment.'
175 N.J. Super. at 332, 418 A.2d at 1285. It should be noted that, in a pension revocation
hearing, "[t]he board is neither bound by an employer's actions regarding continued employment nor required to give any evidentiary weight to the employer's determination which may in
fact involve considerations unrelated to the pension issue of honorable service." Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 12.
A question not considered in the case at bar, is whether or not the Borough of Highlands
was required to dismiss Masse from employment pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:135-9 (West
1969). Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 12-13.
175 N.J. Super. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1286. See Watt v. Mayor of Franklin, 21 N.J. 274,
279, 121 A.2d 499, 501 (1956); Salz v. State House Comm'n, 18 N.J. 106, 111-12, 112 A.2d 716,
718-19 (1955).
56 29 N.J. Super. at 389, 102 A.2d at 666. See, e.g., Walter v. Police & Fire Pension
Comm'n, 120 N.J.L. 39, 198 A. 383 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Hozer v. State, 95 N.J. Super. 196, 230
A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967).
" 175 N.J. Super. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1286. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
n.8 (1970) (social security pensions); Spencer v. Bullock, 216 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (policeman suspended); Daigle v. McLaughlin, 193 F.Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1961) (fireman suspended for
misconduct); Willens v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 451, 561 P.2d 1, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1973) (right to disability benefits); State ex rel. Kirby v. Board of Comm'rs, 129
Conn. 419, 29 A.2d 452 (1942) (fireman denied pension); Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417
(Sup. Ct. Fla. 1978) (judge convicted of felonies); City of Frederick v. Quinn, 35 Md. App. 626,
371 A.2d 724, (Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (pension rights modified by legislature).
5 Id. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1286.
175 N.J. Super. at 332, 418 A.2d at 1285.
o Id.
6' See notes 3-5 supra.
62 175 N.J. Super. at 330, 418 A.2d at 1285.
63Id.
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the court summarized its decision by saying, "[w]e ought not go too
far in imposing civil sanctions for immoral, criminal
conduct ....
[o]ur sense of morality may not be a fair guide to determine which crimes require forfeiture of a pension and which do
not." '
Despite the Masse court's diminution of the prior case law, 5 the
opinion, as it stands, represents a breakthrough in the field of pension rights. Without directly overturning a viable case on point, 66 the
court seized this opportunity to reconsider the need of public employees to feel secure in their provisions for the future. 67
In this era of comprehensive pension programs, it is difficult to
conceive of retirement benefits as rewards; 6 rather, portions of wages
are surrendered to the employer in trust for the employee,69 resulting
in an investment to which a right accrues. 70 The public employee is
not offered the option of investing these funds elsewhere. 7 Remittance of these bare contributions 72 upon the commission of a misdemeanor is clearly inequitable without the accompanying interest or
inured benefits.73
When a pension is revoked for misfeasance in office, there is
some validity to the contention that the employee has injured the
employer, and by so doing has justifiably incurred retribution. 7' Even

6

Id. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1286.
Id. at 329-30, 418 A.2d at 1284-85. The court briefly points out the major issues of various

cases, but does not apply them in any extensive manner to the case at hand. Id. See note 47
supra.
66 See notes 21,
44 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
61 175 N.J. Super. at 333-34, 418 A.2d at 1286-87.
City of Frederick v. Quinn, 35 Md. App. 626, 371 A.2d 724 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977). The
court stated:
[I]t is absurd to speak of a pension as "a bounty springing from the appreciation and
graciousness of the sovereign".... The medieval or even colonial concepts of a
compassionate and generous sovereign rewarding his humble, devoted subjects is
completely alien to our modern views of a democratic government's obligations to
its citizens.
Id. at 628, 371 A.2d at 726. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
9 Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 398 n.2, 197
A.2d 169, 173 n.2 (1964); Mount v. Trustees, Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 86, 335 A.2d 559, 567 (App. Div. 1975).
70 Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 402, 197 A.2d
173, 175 (1964). See also Makwinski v. State, 76 N.J. 87, 94, 385 A.2d 1227, 1231 (1978)
(Conford, P.J.A.D. temporarily assigned, concurring).
71

See note 29 supra.

See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
I Makwinski v. State, 76 N.J. 87, 98-99, 385 A.2d 1227, 1233-34 (1978) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
I' Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 11, at 7-8. See Makwinski v. State, 76 N.J. 87, 92,
385 A.2d 1227, 1230 (1978).
7
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in such a situation, the desirability of applying prorated penalties 3 is
evident. Total revocation based on moral turpitude extrinsic to employment, however, is far more difficult to justify.76 If the conduct of
the employee has damaged the reputation of the employer, or betrayed the public trust,7 an adequate and appropriate remedy lies in
dismissing the employee. 7 ' To go beyond this remedy into the area
of pension benefits, constitutes an absolute condemnation of past
employment,79 and is, in reality, little more than a form of unproductive revenge."
There is no evidence that revocation is a more effective deterrent to crime 8 1 than dismissal, which at least serves a functional purpose in removing the wayward employee. Revocation, however,
Furthermore, a vindictive quality is apserves no such purpose."
parent where, as in Masse, the municipality has not seen fit to remove the employee from service.8 3 If civil sanctioning was
desirable, s4 logic would dictate the sensibility of discharging the
employee,'5 but retaining the pension.
To date, the legislature has only provided for revocation of pension rights for crimes of moral turpitude necessitating incarceration,
and then only for the duration of the confinement itself.8 6 The
Board's acquisition of quasi-judicial status 17 has casually expanded,
occasionally in contradiction to legislative intent."' The Board should
be subject to some form of timely, non-judicial supervision. 9 It is

75 See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
76 175 N.J. Super. at 331, 418 A.2d at 1285. See Makwinski v. State, 76 N.J. 87, 98, 385

A.2d 1227, 1233 (1978) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
I See note 54 supra.
78 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
I It is difficult to perceive the manner in which pension revocation serves to assuage the
employer's reputation, or to restore the public trust.
s See 113 N.J.L. at 233, 173 A.2d at 924.
s' See note 79 supra.
82 See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
3 See note 64 supra and accompanying text.

14 "Confidence in government could be shaken if a public employee in a sensitive position is
continued in office after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude simply because the crime
was unrelated to public employment." 175 N.J. Super. at 330, 418 A.2d at 1284.
11 Id. See Fromm v. Board of Directors, 81 N.J. Super. 138, 145, 195 A.2d 32, 36 (App.
Div. 1963).
s 175 N.J. Super. at 332-33, 418 A.2d at 1286. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (West 1962).
87 See McFeely v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 1 N.J. 212, 215-16, 62 A.2d 686, 687-88
(1948).
" Appeal to the courts is always available, however, in some situations, hardship may be
suffered in the interim period itself. See Mount v. Trustees, Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.,
133 N.J. Super. 72, 90, 335 A.2d 559, 569 (App. Div. 1975).
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further submitted that the Board of Trustees, although a separate entity from the municipality, 90 should be bound to consider the municipality's evaluation of the employee. 91
As a concept, moral turpitude has evaded positive legislative definition. Theoretically, it reflects the standards of the community at
large.92 Realization, however, that the Board of Trustees alone makes
the final determination of whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude, 93 leads to the inevitable conclusion that "moral turpitude"
reflects the standards of the Board. Compounding this discretionary
element further is the ability of the Board to annul any portion, or
all, of a defendant's pension credits.'
The general policy of total revocation followed by the Board"
leaves little room for delineation on the basis of the seriousness of the
offense; for example, theft may exact the same administrative sanction
as murder.'
Additionally, there exists the possibility that two employees, denied pensions for the same crime, may yet be punished to
different degrees, depending upon how many years of service each
has rendered. 97 The argument is well-made that, if the Board is to
have disciplinary power at all, it should exercise such power
consistently,9" and adopt a system of proration" based upon the
severity of the offense.
Masse was previously subjected to criminal punishment by the
courts, 1 ° and the opportunity for civil castigation was rejected when
the municipality chose to continue his employment."10
It is unconscionable that not only Masse, but his dependents,"°S should be exposed to the possibility of another civil sanction. The Board of Trus-

89

To date, the Board is not bound to give the slightest consideration to the employer's

opinion. See note 54 supra.
90Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 12.
1' See note 3 supra.
9
See note 5 supra.
9 See Makwinski v. State, 76 N.J. 87, 385 A.2d 1227 (1978).
14 175 N.J.
Super. at 328, 418 A.2d at 1283.
5 Id.
I "The rule applied by the PERS Board, . . . is inherently arbitrary and may often be
unreasonable." Id. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1286.
9,Id.
9 See note 74 supra.
9 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
1o See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
101See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
11 175 N.J. Super. at 333-34, 418 A.2d at 1286-87. The court makes a brief reference to N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:152-2 (West 1971), regarding the "forfeiture of estate" clause. 175 N.J. Super.
at 333-34, 418 A.2d at 1286-87.
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tees and The Public Employees' Retirement System have incurred no
injury,1° therefore, they should not be permitted to exact a penalty.
Pensions represent a method of providing enforced financial security
for retired employees," ° they should not be abused as disciplinary
tools.
Mary Jean McGraw

See State ex rel. Kirby v. Board of Comm'rs, 129 Conn. 419, 29 A.2d 452, 455 (1942).
Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 401-02, 197
A.2d 169, 174 (1964).
'
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